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NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF PUBLIC AMUSEMENT OPERATORS FOR DANGEROUS PREMISES-While a patron at a dog race track, plaintiff suffered injuries
when she slipped on an empty beverage bottle left in the aisle of the grandstand.
In an action against the proprietor, a motion for directed verdict in favor of defendant was granted on the theory that plaintiff had failed to show defendant's actual
or constructive knowledge of the presence of the bottle; the trial court further
stated that if constructive knowledge were reHed on, the plaintiff must prove that

1949]

RECENT DECISIONS

the bottle had been in the grandstand long enough for the owners, in the exercise of
reasonable care, to have discovered and removed it. Held, reversed; while this
may be the correct rule with respect to ordinary places of business, it is not applicable
in the case of a public amusement park, where many patrons fill the aisles and are
permitted to purchase and drink bottled beverages and to set the empty bottles
anywhere. The question of whether defendant exercised ordinary care should have
beensubmittedtothejury. Wellsv.PalmBeachKennelClub, (Fla.1948) 35 S.

(2d) 720.
The general rule is that the possessor of land is required to use reasonable care
to make the premises safe for the business visitor, or to warn him of dangerous
conditions or activities creating an unreasonable risk of which the possessor knows
or which with reasonable vigilance he could discover.1 This rule has been universally applied to places of public amusement,2 and it is settled that there is no
liability imposed on the owner of an amusement park for injuries to a patron
without showing that the defendant either knew or should have known of the
dangerous condition.8 It is true that the language in numerous opinions seems to
support the trial court's theory that, in the absence of proof of actual notice, the
plaintiff, to prove constructive notice, must show that the dangerous condition has
existed a sufficient length of time for the owners to have discovered and removed
it.4 But a close analysis indicates that the point of emphasis in such cases is that
liability is founded on the proprietor's fault in failing to discover and remedy
the defect, and that he is not subject to strict accountability for all injuries.G He is
under a general affirmative obligation to use due care to see that the premises are
safe and to guard against all risks which might reasonably be anticipated; thus, he
is not exonerated simply because he had no precise knowledge of the defective
condition. 6 While the length of time the condition has existed is a very crucial
point in the case of a latent defect or one not reasonably to be expected, the requirePROSSER, ToRTS, § 79 (1941); 2 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, § 343 (1934).
Chamberlain, "Liability of Proprietor of Place of Public Amusement for Injury
to Patron," 21 CAs. AND CoM. 718 (1915); Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 349
Mo. 1215, 164 S.W. (2d) 318 (1942); 142 A.L.R. 858 at 868 (1943); Boucher
v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc., (La. App. 1947) 30 S. (2d) 211 (incorrectly
relied on by the court in the principal case to support its conclusion that reasonable care
as applied to a race track requires a higher degree of diligence than when applied to any
other place of business).
8
Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 319 Mo. 275, 3 S.W. {2d) 1025
(1928); 61 A.L.R. 1269 at 1289 (1929); Scott v. University of Michigan Athletic
Assoc., 152 Mich. 684, II6 N.W. 624 (1908). In Francis v. Cockrell, L.R. 5 Q.B. 184
{1870), earliest case on ~e subject, the court analogized the position of the owner of
a grandstand to that of the operator of a common carrier. This analogy has been brought
up in recent cases but refuted by the courts. I THOMPSON, NEGLIGENCE, 2d ed., § 996
(1901); Boucher v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc., (La. App. 1947) 30 S. (2d)
21 I; Phillips v. Butte Jockey Club and Fair Assoc., 46 Mont. 338, 127 P. IOI I (1912).
4
Dalton v. Hooper, (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 168 S.W. 84; Hunker v. Warner
Bros. Theatres, 115 W.Va. 641, 117 S.E. 629 (1934); Reiher v. Mandernack, 234 Wis.
568, 291 N.W. 758 (1940); Boucher v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc., (La. App.
1947) 30 S. (2d) 21 I.
G Nabson v. Mordall Realty Corp., 257 App. Div. 659, 15 N.Y.S. (2d) 38 (1939).
6
Redmond v. National Horse Show Assoc., 781'4isc. 383, 138 N.Y.S. 364 (1912).
1
2
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ment of constructive notice might properly be said to have been fulfilled where
large crowds are permitted to drink bottled beverages, purchased on the premises,
and to litter the aisles with the containers.7 The negligence in such a case consists
of the failure to take adequate precautions to guard against injury to patrons
by reason of the bottles being scattered about. 8 The holding in the principal case
seems rational and in accord with the basic theory of the invi'tor's liability in
allowing the jury to find, from circumstances other than the length of time the
defect has existed, that the owner should have known of a dangerous condition
involving an unreasonable risk to his patrons. It is submitted, however, that no
persuasive reason exists for limiting this approach to amusement park cases; considerations of policy and logic justify extending it generally to cases of this class.
Ruth Wanamaker

7 Seligson v. Victory Pool, Inc., 187 Misc. 1067, 66 N.Y.S. (2d) 453 at 453
(1946); "Evidence that people were drinking from and children playing with glass
bottles near a swimming pool sustained a verdict against the operator for injuries to
a patron who cut her foot on a piece of glass bottle in the pool, notwithstanding absence of
proof that other patrons had been in the habit of throwing things into the pool so as to
put the operator on notice."
8 Martin v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 39 Cal. App. (2d) 338, 103 P. (2d) 188
(1940). On the same facts as the principal case, judgment for plaintiff was affirmed; the
question of the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the bottle was not raised, nor
did there seem to be any evidence as to the length of time it had been there.

